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PAYG Public Pension Systems: Two-sided Altruism and Endogenous Growth 
Zaigui Yang+ 
 
Abstract 
Within the framework of an overlapping generations model with two-sided altruism and endogenous 
growth, this paper calculates the rates of fertility, output growth, child-rearing cost, saving, 
consumption, net intertemporal transfer, bequest and gift, and compares the equilibrium solutions 
under different public pension systems. It proves that the fully-fertility-linked public pension system 
(FFLPPS) is equivalent to the system without public pension (WPPS), and the partly-fertility-linked 
public pension system (PFLPPS) is equivalent to the conventional public pension system (CPPS). 
The CPPS is beneficial to developing countries in promoting economic growth and reducing 
population. It is necessary for developed countries to weigh gains and losses carefully if they hope to 
transform their CPPS (or PFLPPS) to the FFLPPS. 
 
I. Introduction 
Some developing countries are suffering from low economic growth and over-population, while 
developed countries are suffering from low fertility and population aging. It is argued that there is an 
interrelation between the population problem and the public pension system, and economic growth is 
impacted by the public pension system. 
Nishimura and Zhang (1995) use an exogenous model to compare a system without public pension, a 
totally fertility-dependent public pension system, and a conventional or partly fertility-dependent public 
pension system. Adopting the conclusion of Nishimura and Zhang (1992)—the optimal allocation with 
public pension is not sustainable when fertility is endogenous, they assume that individuals take the 
public pension level set by the government as given to maximize their own utility. Assuming that 
altruism runs from children to parents, they calculate fertility, gifts, savings, work-period consumption 
and utility. One of their results, the introduction of the totally fertility-dependent public pension 
system26 reduces the fertility rate, seems doubtful intuitively. It is also theoretically contradictory to the 
result of Groezen et al. (2003). 
Zhang and Zhang (1995) extend the model of Nishimura and Zhang (1995). They use an endogenous 
growth model to compare the system without public pension, the fully fertility-related public pension 
system, and the conventional public pension system. Assuming that altruism runs from children to 
parents, they examine the effects of the different public pension systems on the rates of fertility and 
output growth. 
This paper extends Nishimura and Zhang (1995) and Zhang and Zhang (1995). It uses an 
endogenous growth model to compare the system without public pension (WPPS), the conventional 
public pension system (CPPS), the fully-fertility-linked public pension system (FFLPPS) and the 
partly-fertility-linked public pension system (PFLPPS). It assumes that altruism is two-sided: children 
give gifts to parents and parents leave bequests to children. It calculates not only the rates of fertility, 
gift, saving, consumption, but also the rates of output growth, bequest, net intertemporal transfer and 
child-rearing cost. 
                                                     
+ Department of Insurance, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, China. I would 
like to thank two anonymous referees for very helpful comments. Any remaining omissions or errors 
are my own. 
26 The pension benefits are strictly linear increasing with individual’s children number. See 
Nishimura and Zhang (1995) for details. 
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Bequests are sizeable wealth in real life. Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) report that 80% of U.S. 
household wealth is inherited wealth. Abel and Warshawsky (1988) and Zhang and Zhang (2001) 
classify bequest motives into altruistic, exchange, joy-of-giving and accidental motives. In fact, it is 
hard for most people to distinguish bequest motives clearly when they leave bequests to their children. 
Abel and Warshawsky (1988) analyze the joy-of-giving bequest motive in which the utility obtained 
from leaving bequests depends only on the size of the bequests. They exploit the fact that this 
formulation can be interpreted as a reduced form of the altruistic motive for most purposes. Zhang 
and Zhang (2001) prove that altruistic and exchange motives yield equivalent outcomes if the discount 
factors are set the same. Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) consider accidental bequests as a determinant 
of the representative individual’s utility function. This paper also takes bequests as a determinant of 
the representative individual’s utility function. 
Following Saint-Paul (1992), Zhang and Zhang (1995, 1998, 2001), Wigger (1999a, 1999b) and so on, 
this paper adopts the endogenous growth model with Romer’s (1986) type of capital externality. It is 
tractable to compare the balanced growth equilibrium solutions of the system without public pension 
(WPPS), the conventional public pension system (CPPS), the fully-fertility-linked public pension 
system (FFLPPS) and the partly-fertility-linked public pension system (PFLPPS). 
Within the framework of an overlapping generations model with two-sided altruism and endogenous 
growth, this paper obtains some interesting results that have not appeared in the literature. It proves 
that the rates of fertility, output growth, child-rearing cost, saving, consumption, net intertemporal 
transfer, bequest and gift under the FFLPPS are the same as those under the WPPS. The rates of 
fertility, output growth, child-rearing cost, saving, consumption, net intertemporal transfer, bequest and 
gift under the PFLPPS are the same as those under the CPPS. The FFLPPS is equivalent to the 
WPPS, and the PFLPPS is equivalent to the CPPS. 
The rates of fertility and child-rearing cost under the CPPS (or PFLPPS) are smaller than those under 
the FFLPPS (or WPPS). 
The rates of output growth, consumption, net intertemporal transfer, bequest and gift under the CPPS 
(or PFLPPS) are greater than those under the FFLPPS (or WPPS). 
The rate of net intertemporal transfer under the WPPS is larger than the rate of net intertemporal 
transfer outside of the CPPS, both of which are positive. However, the rate of net intertemporal 
transfer outside of the PFLPPS is zero, and the rate of net intertemporal transfer outside of the 
FFLPPS is negative. 
The gift rate under the WPPS is the largest. The gift rate outside of the public pension system under 
the CPPS is larger than that under the PFLPPS, which in turn is larger than that under the FFLPPS. 
Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 computes the stationary optimal allocation for choosing 
a rational pension level. Sections 4, 5 and 6 compute the equilibrium solutions under the CPPS, the 
FFLPPS and the PFLPPS. Section 7 compares the equilibrium solutions. Section 8 concludes the 
paper. 
 
II. The Basic Model: They System without Public Pension (WPPS) 
Individuals. Individuals live for two periods. The generation born at the beginning of period t is called 
generation t. Each individual of generation t earns wage income by supplying inelastically one unit of 
labor, receives bequest income from his parent, consumes part of his incomes, rears his children, 
gives his parent gifts, and saves the rest of his incomes in his work period or first period. In his 
retirement period or second period, he consumes part of the sum of his savings and gifts received 
from his children, and leaves the remaining part as bequests to his children. 
Each individual of generation t derives utility from his work-period consumption ttC , his retirement-
period consumption t 1tC + , his bequest left to each of his children 1tB +  and the retirement-period 
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consumption of his parent 1ttC
− . The representative individual maximizes his utility by choosing the 
rates of saving, gift, fertility in work period and the rate of bequest in retirement period: 
 1t1ttt 1ttt1t1ttt 1ttt}b,n,g,s{ BlnClnClnCln)B,C,C,C(UMax 1tttt +
−
++
−
+ +++=+ σγβα , (1) 
 s.t.   ttttttt
t
t W)hgs(WbWC ++−+= ,      (2) 
1t1tttt1t1t1tt
t
1t Wg)n1(Ws)r1(Wb)n1(C ++++++ +++=++ ,   (3) 
where tW  denotes the wage, ts  the saving rate, tg  the gift rate, and 1tr +  the interest rate. 
1t1t1t WbB +++ = ,        (4) 
where 1tb +  denotes the ratio of the bequest to the wage per worker of generation t+1
27, which is 
called the bequest rate for simplification. The child-rearing cost rate is assumed to be: 
d
tt nqh )1( += ,        (5) 
where tn  is the fertility rate, 1d,0q ≥> , such that the costs of rearing children are either linear or 
convex. Let tt1
t
t WcC = , where t1c  denotes the rate of work-period consumption. Assume that 
0b,n,g,s 1tttt >+  for all t throughout this paper to focus on interior solution. The weights in the utility 
function are assumed as such that 0>>>> σγβα , 1=+++ σγβα . 
Firms. Firms produce a single commodity in competitive markets. The production function 
)k(fLA)LA,K(FY ttttttt ⋅==  is homogeneous of degree one, where tY  denotes output in period t, 
tK  capital stock, tA  labor productivity, tL  labor, ( )tttt LAKk =  capital per unit of effective labor. 
Euler’s theorem gives: 
 )k(fr tt ′= ,         (6) 
)k(fk)k(fA/Ww tttttt ′−== ,       (7) 
where tw  is the wage rate per unit of effective labor. In order to ensure the existence of a balanced 
growth path for the economy, the following particular form of tA  is adopted (see, e.g., Saint-Paul, 
1992; Zhang and Zhang, 1995, 1998; Wigger, 1999a, 1999b; etc.): 
)aL/(KA ttt = ,                   (8) 
where a  is a positive technological parameter. 
Therefore akt = , and  
rafrt =′= )( , wafaafwt =′−= )()(  for all t.      (9) 
The Goods Market. The goods market equilibrium requires that the demand for goods in each period 
be equal to the supply: 
                                                     
27 Following Veall (1986) and Nishimura and Zhang (1995), this paper only considers Nash 
equilibrium. That is, each individual takes the decisions of future generations as given. 
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tttt1t LWsSK ==+ .28         (10) 
The Equilibrium Solutions. Combining equations (7), (8), (9), (10) and the labor force 
tt1t L)n1(L +=+  yields the growth rate of capital per worker: 
)]n1(a/[ws)L/K/()L/K(1 tttt1t1tt +==+ ++θ .    (11) 
Substituting equation (8) into the production function and using akt =  gives that the growth rate of 
output per worker is equal to the growth rate of capital per worker. From equations (7) and (9), one 
can get the growth rate of wage: 
1 / 1t t tW W θ+ = + .         (12) 
A balanced growth equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which the saving rate, the gift rate, the 
fertility rate, etc., are constant, but the wage, the work-period consumption ttC , the retirement-period 
consumption t 1tC + , etc., grow at the same endogenously determined and constant growth rate of 
capital per worker. 
Lagging equation (3) and substituting equations (2)-(5) into equation (1), differentiating equation (1) 
with respect to 1tttt b,n,g,s +  gives the first-order conditions for the maximization problem of 
equations (1)-(3): 
t
1t
t
t C/)r1(C/ ++= βα ,        (13) 
1t
t1t
t
t C/)n1(C/
−−+= γα ,       (14) 
( )( )( ) t 1t1t1t1tttttt C/W)bg(C/n1Wdh ++++ −=+ βα ,    (15) 
1t
t
1tt B/C/)n1( ++ =+ σβ .       (16) 
Equation (13) means the tradeoff between the marginal utility of work-period consumption and that of 
retirement-period consumption through savings. Equation (14) means the tradeoff between the 
marginal utility of the representative individual’s work-period consumption and that of his parent’s 
retirement-period consumption through gifts. Equation (15) means the tradeoff between the marginal 
utility of child-rearing costs and that of net transfers from children to parent. Equation (16) means the 
tradeoff between the marginal utility of retirement-period consumption and that of bequests left to 
children. 
Equating equations (13) and (14), inserting equation (3) and using equation (12) yields: 
γβθ /)r1()1)(n1( +=++ .       (17) 
Dividing equation (15) by equation (13) yields: 
βγτ /hd= ,         (18) 
where bg −=τ is the rate of net intertemporal transfer in equilibrium. 
Substituting equation (17) into equation (11) yields: 
                                                     
28 See Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p.94) or Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995, p.130) for details. 
38 
γβ /es = ,         (19) 
where w/)r1(ae += . 
Substituting equations (2) and (3) into equation (13) yields: 
]/)(d1/[]/)(e1[h βγαγβα +++−= .     (20) 
Substituting equations (18), (19) and (20) into equation (2) yields: 
h)/d1(/e1c1 βγγβ +−−= .       (21) 
Substituting equation (3) into equation (16), and using equation (12) yields: 
ββγσ /)/hde(b += ,        (22) 
b/hdg += βγ .          (23) 
 
III. The Stationary Optimal Allocation 
The government maximizes the balanced growth welfare29 by choosing the stationary optimal rates of 
saving, gift, fertility and bequest, and sets a rational pension level according to the optimal rate of net 
intertemporal transfer. Therefore the government solves the following maximization problem: 
),bWln(ClnClnClnUMax 1t
1t
t
t
1t
t
tt}b,n,g,s{ +−+ +++= σγβα     (24) 
s.t.   t
t
t W)hgsb1(C −−−+= ,       (25) 
1tt
t
1t W)bg)(n1(sW)r1(C ++ −+++= .      (26) 
Manipulation analogous to section 2 gives the optimal solutions: 
r1)1)(n1( pp +=++ θ ,        (27) 
pp dh=τ ,         (28) 
esp = ,           (29) 
)]/()(d1/[)]/()(e1[hp γβγβαγβγβα +++++++−= ,   (30) 
pp h)d1(e1c +−−= .         (31) 
Therefore the government sets the PAYG public pension tax rate as pτ . 
 
                                                     
29 This utility function can be considered as a social welfare function. See Nishimura and Zhang 
(1995, fn.10) and Zhang and Zhang (1995, p.444) for details. 
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IV. The Conventional Public Pension System (CPPS) 
Under the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) public pension system, the government levies pension tax tpWτ  on 
each worker in period t, and pays pension benefits to each retiree in the same period. 
The pension benefits are related to the average social fertility rate under the CPPS. Taking the public 
pension level as given, each individual may give extra gifts to his parent, leave extra bequests to his 
children and choose the other variables deviating from the optimal allocation. Each individual 
maximizes his utility by choosing the rates of saving, gift, fertility and bequest. Thus the representative 
individual solves the following maximization problem: (1) subject to: 
tttptttt
t
t W]hgs[WbWC +++−+= τ ,      (32) 
1t1tt1tpattt1t1t1tt
t
1t Wg)n1(W)n1(Ws)r1(Wb)n1(C +++++++ +++++=++ τ ,  (33) 
where atn  is the average social fertility rate and is equal to tn  in equilibrium. 
Manipulation analogous to section 2 gives the equilibrium solutions: 
γβθ /)r1()~1)(n~1( +=++ ,       (34) 
γβ /es~ = ,         (35) 
]/)(d1/[]/)(dh/)(e1[h~ p βγαγγαγβα +++−+−= ,   (36) 
h~)/d1(dh/e1c~ p1 βγγβ +−−−= ,      (37) 
βγτ /h~d~ = ,         (38) 
ββγσ /)]/h~ddhe[b~ p ++= ,       (39) 
b~/h~dg~ += βγ ,        (40) 
where τ~  is the rate of net intertemporal transfer excess of pτ , or the rate of net intertemporal transfer 
outside of the CPPS. The total rate of net intertemporal transfer in the equilibrium of the CPPS is 
ττ ~p + . And g~p +τ  is equivalent to the total gift rate in the equilibrium of the CPPS. 
 
V. The Fully-fertility-linked Public Pension Systen (FFLPPS) 
The public pension benefits are completely dependent on individual fertility rate under the FFLPPS. 
Taking the public pension level as given, each individual additionally gives his parent gifts during his 
work period and leaves bequests to his children during the retirement period. The net intertemporal 
transfers outside of the FFLPPS depend on the following computation instead of discussions such as 
Nishimura and Zhang (1995) and Zhang and Zhang (1995). Each individual maximizes his utility by 
choosing the rates of saving, gift, fertility and bequest. The representative individual solves the 
following maximization problem: (1) subject to: 
tttptttt
t
t W]hgs[WbWC +++−+= τ ,      (41) 
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1t1tt1tpttt1t1t1tt
t
1t Wg)n1(W)n1(Ws)r1(Wb)n1(C +++++++ +++++=++ τ .   (42) 
The equilibrium solutions are: 
γβθ /)r1()ˆ1)(nˆ1( +=++ ,         (43) 
γβ /esˆ = ,         (44) 
]/)(d1/[]/)(e1[hˆ βγαγβα +++−= ,     (45) 
hˆ)/d1(/e1cˆ1 βγγβ +−−= ,       (46) 
)h/hˆ(dˆ p−= βγτ ,         (47) 
ββγσ /)/hˆde(bˆ += ,        (48) 
bˆ)h/hˆ(dgˆ p +−= βγ ,        (49) 
where τˆ  is the rate of net intertemporal transfer excess of pτ , or the rate of net intertemporal transfer 
outside of the FFLPPS. The total rate of net intertemporal transfer in the equilibrium of the FFLPPS is 
ττ ˆp + . And gˆp +τ  is equivalent to the total gift rate in the equilibrium of the FFLPPS. 
 
VI. The Partly-fertility-linked Public Pension System (PFLPPS) 
Under the PFLPPS, the pension benefits include two parts: one is related to the average social fertility 
rate; another one is dependent on the individual fertility rate. Taking the public pension level as given, 
each individual additionally gives his parent gifts and leaves bequests to his children. The net 
intertemporal transfers outside of the PFLPPS depend on the following computation instead of 
discussions. Each individual maximizes his utility by choosing the rates of saving, gift, fertility and 
bequest. The representative individual solves the following maximization problem: (1) subject to: 
tttptttt
t
t W]hg~s[WbWC ++++−+= ττ ,     (50) 
1t1tt1tt1tpattt1t1t1tt
t
1t Wg)n1(W~)n1(W)n1(Ws)r1(Wb)n1(C ++++++++ +++++++=++ ττ . (51) 
The equilibrium solutions are: 
γβθ /)r1()1)(n1( +=++ ,       (52) 
γβ /es = ,         (53) 
]/)(d1/[]/)(dh/)(e1[h p βγαγγαγβα +++−+−= ,   (54) 
h)/d1(dh/e1c p1 βγγβ +−−−= ,      (55) 
βγτ /)h~h(d −= ,        (56) 
ββγσ /)/dhdhe(b p ++= ,       (57) 
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b/)h~h(dg +−= βγ ,        (58) 
where τ  is the rate of net intertemporal transfer excess of ττ ~p + , or the rate of net intertemporal 
transfer outside of the PFLPPS. The total rate of net intertemporal transfer in the equilibrium of the 
PFLPPS is τττ ++ ~p . And g~p ++ττ  is equivalent to the total gift rate in the equilibrium of the 
PFLPPS. 
 
VII. Comparison of Different Equilibriums 
Comparing the above equilibrium solutions gives: 
nn~nˆn =>= ,         (59) 
θθθθ =<= ~ˆ ,         (60) 
hh~hˆh =>= ,          (61) 
ssˆs~s === ,         (62) 
1111 cc
~cˆc =<= ,        (63) 
ττττττττ ++=+<+= ~~ˆ ppp ,       (64) 
bb~bˆb =<= ,         (65) 
g~g~gˆg ppp ++=+<+= ττττ ,       (66) 
0=τ ,          (67) 
0ˆ <τ ,          (68) 
ττττ ˆ~ >>> ,         (69) 
gˆgg~g >>> ,         (70) 
ττ >p , sˆsp < ,        (71) 
hˆhp > , nˆnp > , θθ ˆp < , if 2γαγβ +≤ , and     (72) 
1p cˆc < , if ββα /)1( 2−> .       (73) 
In the above maximization problems, the first-order condition t 1t
t
t C/)r1(C/ ++= βα  holds for the 
WPPS, the CPPS, the FFLPPS and the PFLPPS. If t
t
1tt2 WCc +=  is defined as the rate of 
retirement-period consumption, and ( ) tt 1tttt WCCc ++=  as the lifetime consumption rate, then ( ) αβr1cc t1t2 +=  and ( )[ ]αβr11cc t1t ++=  holds for the four systems. Thus the behavior of work-
period consumption rate can represent that of the retirement-period consumption rate and that of the 
lifetime consumption rate in the four systems. Of course, this result holds in equilibrium. 
Equations (59)-(66) give the following result. 
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Result 1. The rates of fertility, output growth, child-rearing cost, saving, consumption, net 
intertemporal transfer, bequest and gift under the FFLPPS are the same as those under the WPPS. 
The rates of fertility, output growth, child-rearing cost, saving, consumption, net intertemporal transfer, 
bequest and gift under the PFLPPS are the same as those under the CPPS. 
This result means that the fully-fertility-linked public pension system is equivalent to the system 
without public pension, and the partly-fertility-linked public pension system is equivalent to the 
conventional public pension system. 
Equations (59) and (61) yield the following result. 
Result 2. The rates of fertility and child-rearing cost under the CPPS (or PFLPPS) are smaller than 
those under the FFLPPS (or WPPS).  
Some developed countries are suffering from low fertility. It seems that the FFLPPS may be useful to 
the developed countries. Zhang and Zhang (1995) make such a suggestion. However, it is necessary 
for this paper to explore further. 
Equations (60), (63), (64), (65) and (66) give the following result. 
Result 3. The rates of output growth, consumption, net intertemporal transfer, bequest and gift under 
the CPPS (or PFLPPS) are greater than those under the FFLPPS (or WPPS). 
Equations (69), (67) and (68) give the following result. 
Result 4. The rate of net intertemporal transfer under the WPPS is larger than the rate of net 
intertemporal transfer outside of the CPPS, both of which are positive. However, the rate of net 
intertemporal transfer outside of the PFLPPS is zero, and the rate of net intertemporal transfer outside 
of the FFLPPS is negative. 
Equation (67) means that the gifts outside of the PFLPPS are exactly equal to the bequests outside of 
the PFLPPS. Equation (68) implies that the gifts outside of the FFLPPS are less than the bequests 
outside of the FFLPPS. 
Equation (70) gives the following result. 
Result 5. The gift rate under the WPPS is the largest. The gift rate outside of the public pension 
system under the CPPS is larger than that under the PFLPPS, which in turn is larger than that under 
the FFLPPS. 
Equations (71), (72) and (73) give the following result. 
Result 6. Comparing with the WPPS, the CPPS, the FFLPPS and the PFLPPS, the optimal allocation 
has the highest rate of net intertemporal transfer and the lowest saving rate; the highest rates of child-
rearing cost and fertility and the lowest rate of output growth if 2γαγβ +≤ ; the lowest rate of work-
period consumption if ββα /)1( 2−> . 
Some results of this paper are different from Nishimura and Zhang (1995) because their model is an 
exogenous model with one-sided altruism and without growth. Among the limited comparable results, 
the main differences are as follows: 
• Difference 1. In Nishimura and Zhang (1995), the fertility rate under the WPPS is equal to that 
under the CPPS, which is larger than that under the FFLPPS. However, in this paper, the 
fertility rate under the FFLPPS (or WPPS) is larger than that under the CPPS. 
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• Difference 2. In Nishimura and Zhang (1995), the rate of net intertemporal transfer under the 
FFLPPS is larger than that under the CPPS and that under the WPPS. However, in this paper, 
the rate of net intertemporal transfer under the FFLPPS (or WPPS) is smaller than that under 
the CPPS (or PFLPPS). 
• Difference 3. In Nishimura and Zhang (1995), the saving rate under the FFLPPS is larger than 
that under the WPPS, which in turn is larger than that under the CPPS. However, in this 
paper, they are identical. 
• Difference 4. In Nishimura and Zhang (1995), the work-period consumption rate under the 
FFLPPS is larger than that under the WPPS. However, in this paper, they are equal to each 
other. 
Some results in this paper are also different from Zhang and Zhang (1995) because the altruism is 
one-sided and the PFLPPS is not considered in their model. Among the limited comparable results, 
the main differences are as follows: 
• Difference 1. In Zhang and Zhang (1995), the fertility rate under the WPPS is higher than that 
under the FFLPPS if 2γαγβγ +≤< . However, in this paper, they are the same. 
• Difference 2. In Zhang and Zhang (1995), the growth rate under the FFLPPS is higher than 
that under the WPPS if γβ > . However, they are the same in this paper. 
• Difference 3. In Zhang and Zhang (1995), the optimal allocation has a higher growth rate than 
the WPPS if γβ > . However, in this paper, it is just the contrary if 2γαγβ +≤ . 
 
VIII. Conclusions 
Under the overlapping generations model with two-sided altruism and endogenous growth, this paper 
compares the equilibrium solutions of the system without public pension (WPPS), the conventional 
public pension system (CPPS), the fully-fertility-linked public pension system (FFLPPS) and the 
partly-fertility-linked public pension system (PFLPPS). It proves that the fully-fertility-linked public 
pension system is equivalent to the system without public pension, and the partly-fertility-linked public 
pension system is equivalent to the conventional public pension system. This is an interesting finding 
that has not been revealed in the literature. 
This paper shows that the rates of fertility and child-rearing cost under the CPPS (or PFLPPS) are 
smaller than those under the FFLPPS (or WPPS). Zhang and Zhang (1995) also obtains that the 
fertility rate under the CPPS is lower than that under the WPPS. The result, the fertility rate under the 
CPPS is lower than that under the FFLPPS, is different from that of Nishimura and Zhang (1995). 
This paper also indicates that the rates of output growth, consumption, net intertemporal transfer, 
bequest and gift under the CPPS (or PFLPPS) are greater than those under the FFLPPS (or WPPS). 
Some comparison results concerning these rates are different from those in Nishimura and Zhang 
(1995) and Zhang and Zhang (1995). The differences have been shown in the last section. 
The above main results have valuable policy implications. For example, the CPPS has a relative 
advantage to the PFLPPS based on the equivalence of the two systems. The compulsory public 
pension tax rate under the CPPS is lower than that under the PFLPPS. Therefore the CPPS is easier 
to carry out than the PFLPPS, especially for the developing countries. 
The FFLPPS has a relative advantage to the WPPS based on the equivalence of the two systems. 
One of the basic functions of a public pension system is to prevent individual myopia. The FFLPPS 
has the function, while the WPPS has not. It is almost impossible for any country that has established 
a public pension system to abolish it. 
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It is better for the developing countries that have not established public pension systems to introduce 
the CPPS because it can promote economic growth, restrain population explosion, reduce the child-
rearing cost rate, and increase the consumption rate. Zhang and Zhang (1995) make the same 
suggestion based on the rates of fertility and output growth. 
It is necessary for developed countries to weigh gains and losses if they hope to transform their CPPS 
or PFLPPS30 to the FFLPPS. Although the FFLPPS can increase the fertility rate, it may decrease the 
economic growth rate, increase the child-rearing cost rate, reduce the consumption rate, etc. Thus it is 
better for a developed country to transform its CPPS (or PFLPPS) to the FFLPPS if it cares more 
about the problem of population ageing and low fertility than the others. Otherwise it is suitable to 
maintain the CPPS (or PFLPPS). This is different from Zhang and Zhang (1995). 
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